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Adulthood in Law and Culture 
Vivian E. Hamilton* 
Young people today come of age in a cultural and economic milieu that prolongs their 
attainment of the traditional markers of adulthood.  Their subjective conceptions of the 
transition to adulthood also depart radically from the traditional conception, with its emphasis 
on discrete transition events (including marriage and entry into the workforce).  Instead, the 
modern transition to adulthood is a gradual process comprising the acquisition of general 
capabilities, rather than the achievement of externally constructed events.  The state-established 
age of legal majority stands in marked contrast to this gradual and prolonged process.  Not 
only does it categorically establish the inception of adult status, but states in the mid-twentieth 
century adopted laws lowering statewide ages of majority from twenty-one to eighteen.
 Setting legal adulthood at eighteen fails to accord with the trajectory of individual 
development, the time needed to acquire the skills and education demanded of individuals in 
the modern labor market, and even the social experiences of young people coming of age in 
modern America.  In other words, the legal construction of adulthood is starkly at odds with its 
social and cultural constructions. 
 Moreover, we now understand that young people reliably attain different capacities at 
distinct stages of development.  Thus across a range of policymaking contexts, any categorical 
rule will fail to take account either of context-specific capacities or deficiencies.  The core 
commitments of the liberal democratic state, however, require it to extend to individuals those 
rights which they have attained the capacity to exercise—in other words, to recognize and 
account for context-specific capacities. 
 An ever-growing number of exceptions to the age of majority confirms its diminishing 
utility as a presumptive marker of adult capacity.  Abandoning altogether the presumptive age 
of legal majority in favor of context-specific rules advances the state’s liberal ends and better 
aligns the legal and socio-cultural constructions of adulthood.  The developmental and 
behavioral sciences can and should supplement more traditional policymaking considerations.  
Finally, existing law, already rife with exceptions to the age of majority, demonstrates that 
context-specific decision making imposes no undue burden on lawmakers. 
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 The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not 
disappear when an individual turns 18. . . .  [H]owever, a line must be 
drawn. . . . The age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for 
many purposes between childhood and adulthood.1 
—Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) 
                                                 
 1. The Roper Court went on to hold that age eighteen is “the age at which the line 
for death eligibility ought to rest.”  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005). Several 
years after Roper, the Court held that juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses could not 
be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
Most recently, the Court held that juveniles convicted of crimes, including murder, could not 
be subjected to sentencing schemes that mandated sentences of life without the possibility of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The age of majority is the gateway to adult legal status, 
presumptively converting legal incapacity to capacity.2  Young people 
attaining adult legal status will, for example: lose the presumptive 
entitlement to parental support; lose the ability to disavow contracts 
due to age-based incapacity; gain the ability to participate in civic and 
political life; and, if convicted of a serious-enough criminal offense, 
become susceptible to sentences of life imprisonment or death.3 
 Today, the near universal U.S. age of majority is eighteen, but it 
has historically fluctuated from the mid-teens to the mid-twenties both 
here and abroad.4  Fluctuations in the age of majority have generally 
accorded with changes in the nature of the capacities required of 
society’s adult citizens and the age by which individuals tend to attain 
those capacities.5  Historically, young people have crossed the legal—
and social—threshold to adulthood upon gaining the capacities to 
perform the types of work required of a given time and place, to bear 
arms and fight on behalf of the state, and/or to form and support a 
family. 
 The U.S. age of majority was lowered from twenty-one to 
eighteen, however, for reasons quite unrelated to capacity.6   Yet 
research across disciplines demonstrates that setting the age of 
majority at eighteen fails to accord with the trajectory of individual 
development, the time necessary to acquire the skills and abilities 
demanded of individuals in the modern labor market and broader 
socio-economic context, and even the social experiences of young 
people coming of age in modern American culture.  The legal 
construction of adulthood is thus starkly at odds with the social 
meaning and experiences of adulthood. 
 Neither raising nor lowering the age of majority will redress its 
deficiencies.  Instead, individuals predictably acquire different 
capabilities across the course of their development and exercise them 
                                                 
 2. See discussion infra subpart II.B; see also, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6501 (West 
1992) (“An adult is an individual who is 18 years of age or older.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 1-204 
(2005) (“For the purposes of all [Virginia] laws . . . unless an exception is specifically 
provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age, and shall reach the age 
of majority when he becomes 18 years of age.”); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction 
of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 559 (2000) (“Currently, legal adulthood begins at 
age eighteen.”). 
 3. See discussion infra subpart II.B. 
 4. See discussion infra subpart II.A. 
 5. See discussion infra subpart II.A. 
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with varying levels of competence in different contexts.7  Thus, while 
eighteen is a singularly inapt age at which to set majority across 
virtually every legal context to which it applies, I argue that no 
categorical age of majority can reliably capture the context-specific 
acquisition of various capacities. 
 The inadequacy of the categorical age of majority is reflected in 
the ever-growing number of exceptions to it.  These exceptions aim to 
adapt rules to better conform to the needs of society and capacities (or 
incapacities) of young people.  The exceptions have historically 
tended towards extending rights to individuals younger than the age of 
majority.  Thus young people will have exercised many of the rights 
technically reserved to adults—entering contracts, deciding medical 
treatment, even marrying—long before reaching adult status.8 
 Increasingly, however, legal exceptions extend rules that once 
applied strictly to minors to individuals past the age of majority.9  In 
doing so, these exceptions to presumptive majority recognize that 
most young individuals will enter adulthood unready to assume some 
of the most significant attributes of their new status, such as the 
financial self-sufficiency intimated by adults’ legal disentitlement to 
parental support. 
 For most young adults, financial dependency will instead 
continue well into their adult years.  For the first time in over a century, 
more adults aged eighteen to thirty-four live in their parents’ house 
than in any other living arrangement.10  The Federal Dependent 
Coverage Mandate, part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), is but one example of this type of legally mandated 
exception.  The ACA expanded the availability of health insurance for 
young adults by allowing those aged nineteen to twenty-six to remain 
covered as dependents under their parents’ plans.11  In doing so, it 
                                                 
 7. See, e.g., Paul Arshagouni, “But I’m an Adult Now . . . Sort of”: Adolescent 
Consent in Health Care Decisionmaking and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 315, 360 (2006); see also discussion infra subpart III.C (discussing exceptions to the 
age of majority). 
 8. See discussion infra subpart II.C. 
 9. See discussion infra subpart II.C.5. 
 10. Richard Fry, For First Time in Modern Era, Living with Parents Edges Out Other 
Living Arrangements for 18- to 34-Year-Olds, PEW RES. CTR. 4 (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2016/05/2016-05-24_living-arrangemnet-final.pdf. 
 11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
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highlights the ongoing dependence that now characterizes the early 
years of adulthood.12 
 Scholars and jurists alike have critiqued the body of law 
affecting young people as lacking coherence.13  Much of the criticism 
focuses on the challenges posed by attaching different legal 
consequences to different ages.  Our collection of laws is indeed 
flawed, but these critics miss the mark.  Instead, individuals acquire 
different capabilities across the course of their development and 
exercise them with varying levels of competence in different 
contexts.14 
 Some scholars have argued for exceptions to the age of majority 
in specific legal contexts.  These arguments have included, for 
example, extending the entitlement to child support15 or foster care16 
beyond the age of majority and extending the right to make certain 
medical or procreative decisions without adult intervention to 
individuals who have not yet attained majority.17  Others have argued 
against the presumption of incapacity of minors (children 18  or 
adolescents19) in favor of presumed capacity, with some arguing for 
the recognition of the variable capacities of minors at different ages.20 
 This Article diverges from earlier critiques in its call for 
dismantling altogether the age of majority—thus doing away with the 
conception of adulthood as a distinct legal status.  The core 
                                                 
 12. Id.  The ACA, sometimes referred to as “Health Reform” or “Obamacare,” is a 
major federal health reform measure aiming to make healthcare coverage universal and 
affordable. 
 13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing differences in the legal treatment of adolescents in the abortion and juvenile 
justice contexts); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2012) 
(arguing that by approaching “the concept of maturity in a piecemeal and issue-specific 
fashion,” the law has developed “a legal construct of maturity that is anything but consistent 
or coherent”). 
 14. See, e.g., Arshagouni, supra note 7; see also discussion infra subpart III.C 
(discussing cognitive and socio-emotional development). 
 15. See Monica Hof Wallace, A Federal Referendum: Extending Child Support for 
Higher Education, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 665, 666 (2010). 
 16. See Keely A. Magyar, Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A 
Developmental Perspective on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557, 558 (2006). 
 17. See J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Shifting Boundaries: Abortion, Criminal Culpability 
and the Indeterminate Legal Status of Adolescents, 18 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 91 (2003). 
 18. See Hillary Rodham, Children’s Rights: A Legal Perspective, in CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 21, 33 (Patricia A. Vardin & Ilene N. Brody eds., 
1979); Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, Needed: A Bill of Rights for Children, 
STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1973, at 22, 55. 
 19. See Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless 
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1265, 1362 (2000). 
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commitments of the liberal democratic state require extending to 
individuals the right to exercise those self-regarding capacities of 
which they are capable.  That end calls for adopting context-specific 
rules informed by insights from the social and developmental sciences, 
which can help explain the development of capabilities and their 
exercise in different contexts. 
 Jettisoning the presumptive age of majority in law would have 
the secondary benefit of eroding what has become the cultural 
archetype of adulthood.  Studies have revealed that young people 
conceive of the adult status as a state of individualism and 
independence. 21   It is a normative construction that not only 
undermines the importance of community but is also markedly 
incongruent with the ongoing dependence typical of today’s young 
adults. 
 Part II sets the age of majority in historical and legal contexts.  
Insights from social history and anthropology help explain cultural 
and structural factors that influence adult status and the conception of 
adulthood.  This Part thus describes the legal construction of 
adulthood and how the line between minority and adulthood came to 
be drawn at age eighteen.  It demonstrates that setting the age of 
majority at eighteen was an ill-conceived move set in motion by the 
wartime need to lower the draft age and facilitated by what was a 
subsequent historical aberration—the rapid transition to adulthood 
that occurred during a postwar industrial economy that enabled young 
people with few skills to earn high wages, thereby enabling them to 
marry and establish households at young ages. 
 The legal construction of adult status is starkly at odds with the 
modern social meaning and experiences of adulthood.  Part III 
provides a social history of the transition to adulthood and describes 
the sociocultural construction of modern adulthood.  Young people 
today conceive of adulthood differently than they have in the past.  
They come of age in a cultural and economic context that prolongs 
their achievement of certain traditional markers of adulthood.  For 
example, in a service-based postindustrial economy, the vast majority 
of well-paying jobs require some postsecondary education or training.  
Individuals achieve financial independence, marriage, and parenthood 
a full decade or more after reaching legal adult status.  Along with 
insights from the developmental sciences into relevant aspects of 
development from adolescence through early adulthood, this survey 
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makes plain the incongruence between adult status as constructed by 
U.S. law and adult status as conceptualized and experienced by 
individuals. 
 Part IV argues that the disjunction between social and legal 
constructions of adulthood harms individuals and contravenes the 
core commitments of the liberal democratic state.  It proposes that 
lawmakers implement fully what they have already begun to 
implement piecemeal—abandoning the presumptive age of legal 
majority and adopting legal rules that account for the context-specific 
acquisition of capabilities.  It argues that today’s lawmakers would be 
remiss to ignore relevant and readily available research across the 
social and developmental sciences, in addition to more traditional 
policy considerations.  Indeed, some legislators, jurists, and legal 
scholars have begun to consider the implications of some of this 
research.22 
 The age of majority is a construct that has quite lost any social or 
legal utility it may have once had, and it should thus be abandoned.  
The remainder of this Article examines it, details its flaws, and 
proposes a principled and pragmatic alternative to it. 
II. THE LEGALLY CONSTRUCTED STATUS OF ADULTHOOD 
 Sir Henry Maine’s observation about the movement away from 
status in progressive societies may hold true as a general matter across 
legal realms, but counterexamples abound.23  In law, “status” denotes a 
group sharing some set of attributes that justifies its membership 
being governed by a common set of rules.24  Legal statuses can thus 
facilitate the efficient functioning of a complex society.  “Corporation,” 
                                                 
 22. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (holding unconstitutional 
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by an offender younger than age 
eighteen).  Almost entirely ignored, however, though particularly useful in the legislative 
contexts which are this Article’s primary focus, are the contributions of behavioral decision 
research.  This research offers a framework and methods for studying and assessing decision-
making competence and accounts for both individual and situational variability.  Baruch 
Fischhoff, Assessing Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 
12, 13 (2008). 
 23. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY 
HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (5th ed. 1873) (“[T]he 
movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to 
Contract.”); see also Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 
31, 38-41 (2006) (discussing the resistance to change of certain aspects of the marital status). 
 24. “Status” in the legal context is defined as “[t]he fact or position of belonging to a 
group which is subject to certain legal rights or limitations.” Status, OXFORD ENGLISH 
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“marriage,” and “minor,” for example, are all legal statuses defined 
and governed by distinct sets of legal rules.  “Adult” is another. 
 Like the law generally, statuses shape and are shaped over time 
by social forces.  Their meanings can be at once legally and socially 
constructed, and they thus evolve along with changing social 
circumstances.  The status of “wife,” for example, once comprised the 
near total legal incapacity imposed by the doctrine of coverture.25  
Social pressure led to the revising of the status through the repeal of 
coverture with states’ adoption of Married Women’s Property Acts and 
eventually to the formal equality of wives and husbands.26 
 Childhood and adulthood are also socially and legally 
constructed statuses whose meanings have varied dramatically over 
time and across cultures.27  Despite what may appear to be the 
inevitability of our current binary classification system, in which 
individuals are either minors or adults, the progression from 
childhood to adulthood is fluid and not readily amenable to biological 
definition.28  Instead, structural (e.g., legal and economic norms) and 
cultural (e.g., social norms) changes have influenced the course and 
timing of individuals’ transitions to adulthood. 
 The age of majority has historically fluctuated depending on the 
capacities required of adults at different times and places.  It has also 
varied according to the capacities required of different social roles that 
young individuals were destined to fill.  In Medieval England, for 
example, the age of majority for English males destined for the 
military status of knighthood was twenty-one, before which they 
would not have completed the training nor gained the strength 
required of them.  However, young men destined for agricultural life 
attained adult status at the significantly younger age of fifteen, by 
which they would have gained the capacity to engage in agricultural 
                                                 
 25. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 10-12 
(2000). 
 26. See, e.g., NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND 
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 158-59 (1982).  Marital status itself, 
moreover, continues to evolve, most recently when the Supreme Court held that same-sex 
couples have a constitutional right to marry.  See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2608 (2015). 
 27. See, e.g., BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE 
TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 26 (2008) (“The 
timing of transition from childhood to adulthood is strongly influenced by issues of class and 
culture as well as by issues of race and gender.”); Annette Ruth Appell, The Pre-Political 
Child of Child-Centered Jurisprudence, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 706 (2009) (arguing that 
childhood is a “socially constructed category deeply connected to race, gender, class, and 
citizenship”). 
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work.29  The following subparts survey the historical evolution of the 
legal age of majority, significant aspects of the modern construction 
of the legal status, and exceptions to that presumptive legal status. 
A. The Age of Majority: A Brief History 
 Early Roman law set the age of majority at the age by which 
individuals would presumably have attained the intellectual capacities 
required to exercise full citizenship, manage their affairs, and become 
parents and the heads of families themselves—age fifteen for males.30  
But while the onset of puberty may have signaled the physical 
capacity to become parents, the Romans apparently believed that it 
failed to coincide with young males’ attainment of full intellectual 
maturity.  Accordingly, Roman law placed free males who were 
technically “of full years and rights” under the temporary 
guardianship of adults known as Curatores.31  A Curator’s approval 
was required to validate young males’ formal acts or contracts until 
they reached twenty-five years of age.32  Indeed, Roman law used the 
terms “minority” and “majority” in reference, not to age fifteen, but 
instead to age twenty-five—the age of plenam maturitatem, or full 
maturity.33 
 Throughout other parts of Europe, the attainment of physical 
capacity—particularly the ability to participate in warfare—
determined legal maturity.34  The age of majority between the ninth 
and eleventh centuries was fifteen for males.35  When the nature of 
warfare changed during the Middle Ages so did the age of majority.36  
The increasing weight of defensive armor and growing use of 
mounted cavalry required both greater strength and skill on the part of 
the English knights who fought on behalf of the crown.37  The age of 
                                                 
 29. T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 22, 30 (1960). 
 30. MAINE, supra note 23, at 155; James, supra note 29, at 25.  
 31. MAINE, supra note 23, at 156. 
 32. Id. at 156-57. 
 33. Id. at 156; James, supra note 29, at 33. 
 34. James, supra note 29, at 25.  The age of majority freed an individual from the 
wardship or tutelage of his adult guardian, entitled him to marry, and required him to claim 
his inheritance.  Id. at 30-31. 
 35. Id. at 24-25.  Historians have noted that, while fifteen was the age of majority in 
ninth- and tenth-century France, Germany, and northern Europe, there is no “clear authority” 
that it was also the English age of majority during that time.  They consider it reasonable to 
assume, however, that it was.  Id. at 26-27. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 27; see also 2 WM. A. SHAW, THE KNIGHTS OF ENGLAND (1906) (listing 
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eligibility for knighthood (the equivalent of the age of majority at the 
time) increased to twenty-one, by which age young men would have 
gained the strength and completed the training required of those who 
fought in the heavy cavalry.38 
 Not all English males were destined for the honor of military 
tenure.  Socage tenure, for example, was an agricultural status held by 
tenants who worked the land of feudal lords to whom they owed rent.39  
The requisite capacities for those who held this status were the 
abilities to farm and conduct their “rustic employs.”40  The age of 
majority for socage tenants seems to have originally been fourteen, 
though it was later raised to fifteen by local custom.41 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the age required for the elite status of 
knighthood was the age whose imprint would endure.42  English 
historical and common law traditions became law throughout the 
British Commonwealth.43  Twenty-one remained the age of majority 
for centuries in England, as well as throughout much of the Western 
world and nations that incorporated English traditions.44 
 The immediate historical origins of the U.S. age of majority lie 
in the English common law tradition.45  The American colonies, then 
the United States, adopted age twenty-one as the near universal age of 
majority.46  The U.S. age of majority remained unchanged from the 
country’s founding well into the twentieth century.  In 1942 wartime 
needs prompted Congress to lower the age of conscription from 
twenty-one to eighteen, a change that would eventually lead to the 
lowering of the age of majority generally.47 
 For a period of years following the lowering of the draft age to 
eighteen, the voting age (and the general age of majority) remained 
twenty-one.  The obligation of military service, however, has long 
                                                 
 38. See James, supra note 29, at 28. 
 39. Id. at 30. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 29-30. 
 42. Id. at 33. 
 43. See WENDELL W. CULTICE, YOUTH’S BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT: A HISTORY OF 
VOTING AGE IN AMERICA 72 (1992). 
 44. James, supra note 29, at 22, 33. 
 45. See id. at 25-26. 
 46. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
UNDER THE LAW 248 (2004). 
 47. See CULTICE, supra note 43, at 7, 20; see also Vivian E. Hamilton, Democratic 
Inclusion, Cognitive Development, and the Age of Electoral Majority, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 
1447, 1461-62 (2012) [hereinafter Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion] (discussing the influence 
of the Second World War on public sentiment and Congress’ initiative to lower the voting 
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been linked to the right to political participation. 48   Thus 
Congressional debates to subject eighteen-year-olds to the draft were 
soon followed by proposals to also extend to eighteen-year-olds the 
right to vote.49  These proposals led to the eventual passage of the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment in 1971, lowering the voting age to 
eighteen in both state and federal elections.50 
 Once eighteen had become the age of conscription and of the 
franchise, it began to replace twenty-one across a range of contexts 
and has been adopted as the near universal age of majority.51  Forty-
four states have adopted eighteen as the presumptive age of legal 
majority.52  Six have set their ages of majority higher, with five states 
setting it at nineteen and one at twenty-one.53 
 Eighteen has thus become firmly entrenched as the presumptive 
age of majority, replacing in just a few decades its centuries-old 
predecessor.  Its widespread adoption notably reflected a desire for a 
certain sort of consistency rather than a widely held consensus that 
young people reached maturity or generally attained adult-like 
capabilities before age twenty-one. 
 The impetus for lowering the age of majority, of course, was the 
immediate need for large numbers of soldiers to participate in U.S. 
wartime efforts.  Although having less to do with maturity of 
judgment than with physical maturity, other age-based limitations 
previously imposed on young people between eighteen and twenty fell 
alongside the age of conscription.  The following subpart briefly 
describes some of the more significant of the legal changes that 
currently accompany the attainment of the age of majority.54 
                                                 
 48. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 19 (2005) (“In 
classic republican theory, the rights of collective self-government stood shoulder to shoulder 
with the responsibilities of collective self-defense.”); see ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT 
TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (2000). 
 49. CULTICE, supra note 43, at 22. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens . . . eighteen years of age 
or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of age.”). 
 51. Termination of Support—Age of Majority, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/termination-of-child-support-age-of-majority. 
aspx (last updated Mar. 2015) (listing statutory citations for the ages of majority of each U.S. 
state and territory). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. For more exhaustive discussions of the effects of majority, see Larry 
Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision of 
Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 285-364 
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B. Legal Effects of Majority: An Overview 
 Today, the legal age of majority reflects a presumption that 
typical individuals of that age are “mature enough to function in 
society as adults, to care for themselves, and to make their own self-
interested decisions.”55  Every state has adopted a legal age of majority 
through various legislative or judicial measures.56   
 Designated statutory provisions establishing statewide ages of 
majority, for example, generally provide that upon reaching the 
established age, a person “shall be an adult for all purposes 
whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, 
privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities.”57  Some states have 
adopted an age of majority indirectly, usually through statutory 
provisions that establish the age at which parents’ duty of support 
presumptively terminates. 58   Finally, common and statutory law 
frequently address more directly other age-related laws—both those 
that comport with the age of majority and those that act as exceptions 
to it.  The following subparts briefly identify some of the more 
significant of the civil effects that attend the age of majority. 
1. Disentitlement to Parental and/or State Support 
 There is a strong presumption that a young person’s entitlement 
to parental support ends at majority, generally age eighteen.59  A 
number of states allow the extension of support orders past eighteen if 
a child is enrolled in but has not yet graduated from high school.60 
 Similarly, young people presumptively age out of foster care 
once they turn eighteen or, in some states, nineteen.61  Some states 
provide for continuing foster care past age eighteen when the young 
person is enrolled in some sort of educational or rehabilitative 
program.62  Others give their courts discretion to determine whether to 
                                                 
 55. Scott, supra note 2. 
 56. See, e.g., id. 
 57. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-1d (2015) (lowering the statewide age of 
majority from twenty-one to eighteen). 
 58. See, e.g., id. 
 59. Termination of Support—Age of Majority, supra note 51.  Forty-four states set 
the age of majority at eighteen.  Id. 
 60. See, e.g., id.  For example, twenty-four states will allow the extension of support 
orders to age nineteen if certain conditions are met; some other states permit extensions 
beyond nineteen.  Id. 
 61. See Magyar, supra note 16, at 564-73. 
 62. The states include Arkansas, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.  See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a)(1)(B)(ii) 
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continue state custody past age eighteen based on factors that can 
include the young person’s best interests or need for services.63  Only a 
few states’ statutes explicitly provide for retaining custody for the 
purpose of helping a young person successfully transition to 
independence.64  Dedicated federal funds exist to help states provide 
foster care only to individuals younger than eighteen and eighteen-
year-olds enrolled in high school who will likely graduate before their 
nineteenth birthdays.65 
 By ending parental and state support obligations at majority, the 
law treats those who are aged eighteen and over or who have 
completed a high school education as capable of financial 
independence and responsible for their own financial support.66  A 
high school education may in previous decades have enabled financial 
self-sufficiency, but as Part IV demonstrates, high school alone rarely 
suffices.  In the modern economy, well-paying jobs providing the 
opportunity for middle-class living typically require postsecondary 
education or training.67  The legal effects of the age of majority 
operate to leave high school graduates without parental support before 
allowing them a sufficient opportunity to attain financial security.  In 
doing so, the age of majority both disserves young people and 
ineffectively meets the workforce needs of the employers that drive 
the nation’s economy. 
                                                                                                             
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6302 (2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-510(B) (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 26-6-6.1 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-102(b)(5)(G) (2016). 
 63. These states include Alaska, Illinois, Iowa, and New Jersey.  See ALASKA STAT. 
§ 47.10.080(c)(1)(B) (2015); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-31(1) (1987); IOWA CODE 
§ 232.102(1)(b) (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2.3 (West 2016). 
 64. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, and New Jersey.  See ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-521.01(A)-(B) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-306(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2016); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.140(1)(d) (West 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2.3 (West 
2016). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 608a, 619(2)(B), 672 (2012).  The Foster Care Independence Act 
(FCIA) permits states to use federal money to fund independent living programs for young 
people aged eighteen to twenty-one.  Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 
106-169, § 121, 113 Stat. 1822, 1829-30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(w)).  
Only about half of young people between eighteen and twenty-one are eligible for the room 
and board allotment provided by the statute, which totals just over $1400 annually per 
individual.  See Magyar, supra note 16, at 563; Cynthia Andrews Scarcella et al., The Cost of 
Protecting Vulnerable Children IV: How Child Welfare Funding Fared During the 
Recession, URBAN INST. 16-18 (2004), http://www.urban.org/research/publication/cost-
protecting-vulnerable-children-iv (select “Download PDF”). 
 66. The law in just under half of the states assumes that financial dependence will 
end, not necessarily at age eighteen, but instead upon the young person’s graduation from 
high school.  Magyar, supra note 16, at 564. 
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2. Freedom from Parental Authority 
 Legal adults gain independence from parental authority.  During 
their children’s minority, parents have not only a legally enforceable 
obligation to provide for the support of their children; they also have a 
constitutional right to the “custody and control” of their children.68  
“Custody and control” encompasses the ability to make all manner of 
decisions on their behalf.69 
 The state exercises its parens patriae power to enact regulations 
that interfere with parental authority in areas including education and 
public health.70  Otherwise, the state generally defers to parents’ child-
rearing practices so long as their caregiving does not fall to a level that 
would constitute statutorily defined abuse or neglect.71 
 Parents’ day-to-day authority over their children is thus 
universally acknowledged and respected; at the same time, its 
contours are rarely formally defined.  Parents decide where their 
children will live, where they will attend school, which doctors will 
attend them, which medical procedures they will undergo, and every 
aspect of how they will be raised—their daily schedules, activities, 
diets, etc.  Once an individual is identified as a parent, community 
actors such as school officials and health care providers afford them 
the decision-making authority that attend that status.72 
                                                 
 68. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding 
unconstitutional state legislation requiring that all children be educated in public schools and 
recognizing parents’ rights “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their 
control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) (holding unconstitutional state 
legislation restricting the teaching of foreign languages in elementary schools and 
recognizing parents’ rights to “establish a home and bring up children”). 
 69. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding 
unconstitutional a state third-party visitation statute that permitted any person to petition a 
court for visitation with a child at any time because the statute “failed to accord the 
determination of . . . a fit custodial parent[] any material weight”).  The plurality in Troxel 
stated “that the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to 
‘establish a home and bring up children’ and . . . ‘to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control.’”  Id. at 65-66 (first quoting Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; then 
quoting Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534-35). 
 70. See, e.g., Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 534 (noting “the power of the State 
reasonably to regulate all schools [and] to require that all children of proper age attend some 
school”); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (observing that “the state may do much, go very far, 
indeed” to advance the general welfare infringing upon parents’ rights). 
 71. See Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v. Granville, 
2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 287-96 (arguing in favor of state noninterference in parenting 
generally). 
 72. A notable exception exists in the case of noncustodial parents, in which case a 
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 Just as many aspects of the parent’s authority tend to exist 
informally, its technical cessation once a child reaches the age of 
majority also tends to occur informally.  However, two legal 
doctrines—invoked, ironically, when there is a failure or absence of 
presumptive parental authority—help delineate the contours of 
parental authority. 
 The first is the doctrine of emancipation, which confers upon a 
minor “the rights, duties, privileges, and responsibilities provided by 
the civil law to a person who has reached the age of majority under 
civil law.”73  Generally, minors found to be living independent of their 
parents and supporting themselves may be declared emancipated.74  
Most states provide for some form of emancipation through either 
statutory or common law.75  However, not all states have formally 
adopted the doctrine, and some that have done so provide only a 
limited array of rights to emancipated minors.76  Certain transition 
events most commonly appear as justification for a child’s 
emancipation—the child’s marriage, pregnancy, or military service.77  
The rights of emancipated minors typically allow them to enter 
contracts (such as lease agreements), receive certain forms of public 
assistance usually reserved to heads of household, and retain their own 
earnings.78  Emancipation also relieves parents of the duty to support 
the minor child.79 
 The second legal mechanism, the ungovernability action, permits 
parents to initiate a judicial action seeking to have a minor child found 
“ungovernable.”80  A minor may be brought under court supervision if 
                                                 
 73. HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-25 (2015).  See generally Carol Sanger & Eleanor 
Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 239 (1992) (describing the legal processes by which minors may become 
emancipated). 
 74. See Sanger & Willemsen, supra note 73, at 240. 
 75. See id. at 240-41. 
 76. See Bethany Stasiak, Statutory and Judicial Emancipation of Minors in the 
United States, BOS. COOP NETWORK (2002), http://bostoncoop.net/lcd/emancipation/ 
emancipation_deliverable.pdf. 
 77. See id. 
 78. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN., § 38-102 (2015) (providing only for the minor’s right 
to enter contracts, including those involving real and personal property); WIS. STAT. § 48.987 
(2015) (providing that a self-supporting minor is entitled to his or her own earnings); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 349.5 (2016) (providing for the granting of public 
assistance to eligible emancipated minors). 
 79. See William E. Dean, Note, Ireland v. Ireland: Judicial Emancipation of Minors 
in Idaho: Protecting the Best Interests of the Child or Conferring a Windfall upon the Parent?, 
31 IDAHO L. REV. 205, 215 (1994). 
 80. See generally Randy Frances Kandel & Anne Griffiths, Reconfiguring 
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the minor is found to be a “habitual truant or is incorrigible, 
ungovernable, or habitually disobedient and beyond the lawful control 
of his or her parents, guardian or lawful custodian.”81  State statutes 
adopt intentionally vague standards under which a young person’s 
actions, albeit lawful but which violate the parents’ mores and 
expectations, may justify a court’s determination that the youth should 
be in the custody of a social services department for placement and 
treatment in a foster home or other institution.82  These actions can 
include engaging in sexual relationships over parents’ objections, 
being truant from school, violating curfews, and general 
disobedience.83 
 Emancipated minors step into the shoes of their parents, 
exercising for themselves the authority that parents would normally 
exercise over them.  Parents who successfully have a child adjudicated 
ungovernable allow the state, at least temporarily, to substitute its 
parens patriae power for parental control.  Ungovernability actions 
illustrate the sort of authority parents are entitled to exercise over their 
children and with which children are expected to comply.  Even if a 
child’s actions stop short of criminal or delinquent behavior—such as 
general noncompliance with parents’ wishes—the state may act to 
reinforce parental authority.  Thus both emancipation and 
ungovernability actions help illustrate the scope of parental authority. 
3. Contract Rights 
 On reaching the age of majority, individuals may disaffirm 
contracts entered during their minority.84  The common law has for 
centuries provided minors this protection, known as the infancy 
defense or infancy doctrine.85  The infancy doctrine has historically 
existed to protect young people from squandering their wealth or from 
falling prey to unscrupulous adults who would take advantage of their 
inexperience in the marketplace.86  Disaffirmance does not generally 
                                                                                                             
SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (2003) (describing and critiquing the ungovernability action as a 
means of resolving parent-child conflict and proposing in its stead a form of civil action that 
prioritizes not only parental decision-making rights but also adolescent autonomy rights). 
 81. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 732 (McKinney 2010). 
 82. Kandel & Griffiths, supra note 80, at 997. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 7 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 27.2 (rev. ed. 2002); 5 SAMUEL 
WILLISTON & RICHARD LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 9:3-:5 (4th ed. 
1993). 
 85. See 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 84, § 9:2. 
 86. Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: 
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permit the rescinding individual to reap the benefit of the voided 
contract.  Instead, each party generally must return to the other any 
consideration given.87 
 A 2009 federal statute, the Credit Card Accountability, 
Responsibility, and Disclosure Act (CARD Act), goes further than the 
infancy doctrine in providing protection to minors.88  The CARD Act 
prohibits any contract for a credit card entered by an individual 
younger than twenty-one unless one of two exceptions apply: (1) an 
adult twenty-one years or older cosigns and accepts joint liability for 
any debt incurred pursuant to the contract; or (2) the individual 
demonstrates “independent means of repaying” any debt incurred.89 
 Common and statutory law have both created several exceptions 
to the infancy defense.90  One of these exceptions prevents the later 
disaffirmance of contracts that provide minors the “necessaries of 
life.”91  Thus when minors purchase basic necessities, the exception 
aims to counteract one of the potential drawbacks of the infancy 
defense—merchants’ unwillingness to conduct business with minors 
for fear of later disaffirmance.92  Other statutorily created exceptions 
prohibit the disaffirmance of certain types of contracts where 
legislatures deemed finality and certainty to outweigh the right of 
disaffirmance. 93   These exceptions commonly include insurance 
contracts, child support agreements, and student loans.94 
                                                 
 87. 7 PERILLO, supra note 84, § 27.6.  The common law imposed no duty on the 
minor to return consideration or goods no longer in the minor’s possession.  Modern courts, 
however, have been more willing to require minors to make restitution to the adult 
contracting party in such circumstances.  Id. 
 88. Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. 
No. 111-24, § 301, 123 Stat. 1734, 1747-48 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2012)). 
 89. Id.  For a critique of the CARD Act, see Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough To 
Fight, Old Enough To Swipe: A Critique of the Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit CARD 
Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407.  Schwartz argues that the Act’s provisions “run[] badly afoul of 
th[e] broad societal consensus [that eighteen-year-olds are adults], roll[] back the clock to 
medieval times, and undermine[] the dignity of eighteen-year-olds.”  Id. at 408.  He also 
argues that because the Act makes credit more difficult for young people to obtain, it stifles 
youthful entrepreneurship and thus deprives society of the potential benefits of these 
ventures.  Id. 
 90. 7 PERILLO, supra note 84, § 27.8; 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 84, § 9:18; 
DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 488-89. 
 91. Sources cited supra note 90. 
 92. Irving M. Mehler, Infant Contractual Responsibility: A Time for Reappraisal and 
Realistic Adjustment?, 11 U. KAN. L. REV. 361, 364-65 (1963). 
 93. DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 483 n.10. 
 94. 7 PERILLO, supra note 84, § 27.3; 5 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 84, § 9:6; 
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 It is only once individuals enter adulthood that merchants may 
transact business with them without fear of disaffirmance.  Yet the 
threat of disaffirmance does little to dissuade merchants or hinder 
minors from conducting business.  Minors are instead active and 
significant participants in the marketplace, as both consumers and 
sellers.  Market research into a single year of their economic activity 
estimated that minors spent nearly $190 billion in economic 
transactions and estimated their spending to increase to nearly $209 
billion by 2011, despite a projected 3% decline in teen population.95  
Scholars observe that teens’ spending power, particularly through 
increasing online spending in which they can participate in economic 
activity in virtual anonymity, gives minors “the potential to cause 
serious economic consequences to online businesses by disaffirming 
contracts in droves.”96  Yet there is scant evidence of any impending 
economic calamity. 
 While the right to contract is regularly touted as one of the rights 
of adulthood, it is in reality a right that is regularly exercised by 
minors.  This regular involvement in market transactions arguably 
renders the right to contract an almost-irrelevant marker of the 
transition to adult status.  Indeed, for decades, both scholars and 
jurists have been calling for the doctrine’s overhaul or outright 
repeal.97 
 Critics of the infancy doctrine argue that adolescents have 
sufficient capacity to enter contracts to which they should be held.  
The doctrine may have the perverse effect of permitting market-savvy 
individuals to later disavow contracts that they were sufficiently 
capable to enter as minors.98  More recently, commentators have 
pointed to the growing body of developmental research tending to 
confirm the cognitive capacity of adolescents to enter contracts.99  To 
                                                 
 95. Vahe Habeshian, By 2011, Teen Market Shrinks, Spending Clout Soars to 
$200B, MARKETINGPROFS (June 29, 2007), http://www.marketingprofs.com/opinions/2007/ 
19516/by-2011-teen-market-shrinks-spending-clout-soars-to-200b; Teen Market To Surpass 
$200 Billion by 2011, Despite Population Decline, MARKETINGCHARTS (June 28, 2007), 
http://www.marketingcharts.com/traditional/teen-market-to-surpass-200-billion-by-2011-
despite-population-decline-817/. 
 96. Cheryl B. Preston, CyberInfants, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 225, 268 (2012). 
 97. See, e.g., Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) 
(acknowledging the defects of the infancy doctrine but suggesting that the legislature was the 
proper branch to alter the doctrine rather than the court); DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 518; 
Mehler, supra note 92, at 364. 
 98. DiMatteo, supra note 86, at 485. 
 99. See, e.g., Michael Glassman & Donna Karno, On Establishing a Housing Right 
of Contract for Homeless Youth in America, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 437, 453 (2009) 
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the extent the infancy doctrine flies in the face of social reality, 
provides unneeded protection to (at least a subset of) minors, and 
contravenes the core moral underpinning of contract law itself—the 
keeping of promises—it is ripe for revision.100 
4. The Right to Full Labor Market Participation 
 Federal and state laws impose restrictions on the types and hours 
of employment in which individuals younger than eighteen may 
engage.  Federal law, through the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 
curtails the employment of individuals younger than sixteen, but it 
imposes relatively few restrictions on the employment of those aged 
sixteen and older.101  The FLSA instead leaves sixteen- and seventeen-
year-olds largely free to engage in paid employment in nonhazardous 
occupations.102  Many states, however, have adopted measures that 
extend greater protections to older teens with the goal of preventing 
their paid work from interfering with their health or education.  These 
measures generally impose limits on the number of hours sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds may work.103  Once workers reach age eighteen, 
they are no longer subject to these special protections. 
 The provisions of the FLSA and other labor regulations that free 
individuals from restrictions on their employment upon reaching the 
age of majority roughly correspond with the completion of high 
school.  As noted above and discussed more fully below, economic 
changes have made postsecondary education increasingly necessary 
to obtaining middle-class income.  Due to increases in the costs of 
that education and parents’ unwillingness or inability to provide 
ongoing financial support, more students today than in recent decades 
find it necessary to work either full- or part-time while enrolled in 
school.104 
                                                                                                             
is not supported by developmental research . . . .”); Cunningham, supra note 54, at 292 
(noting the absence of “effort to change the infancy doctrine despite criticism from 
academics and even courts [and] despite the . . . widespread agreement among psychologists 
that children’s cognitive abilities develop at a far earlier age than originally thought”). 
 100. See Cunningham, supra note 54, at 293-94; Hartman, supra note 19, at 1303-04. 
 101. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07, 212 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a) (2011).  Federal 
regulations prohibit the employment of all individuals under eighteen in hazardous 
occupations.  29 C.F.R. § 570.2(a)(1)(ii); see also 29 C.F.R. § 570.50-.68 (listing hazardous 
occupations). 
 102. The Act imposes no work hour restrictions on individuals aged sixteen and over.  
29 C.F.R. §§ 570.2(a)(1)(i), .35, .70(a). 
 103. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 143 (McKinney 2016). 
 104. Anne H. Gauthier & Frank F. Furstenberg Jr., Historical Trends in Patterns of 
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 It is regrettable that the difficulty of financing postsecondary 
education requires many students to combine work and school, 
increasing the length of time required to complete their educations 
and obtain desirable employment.  Ameliorating this difficulty might 
entail any number of policy revisions.  Those efforts arguably ought 
not occur, however, by way of revisions to existing labor protections. 
5. The Right to Political and Civic Participation 
 With few exceptions, individuals acquire the rights and duties of 
political and civic participation at age eighteen. The national voting 
age is eighteen.105  States have the authority to set the voting age lower, 
but the Twenty-Sixth Amendment prevents their setting it higher.106  
Some states permit seventeen-year-olds to vote in primary elections if 
they will turn eighteen by the general election, but no state has chosen 
to allow individuals younger than eighteen to vote.107  There has been a 
global move to lower the voting age, as well as scattered efforts in 
several U.S. states and municipalities to do so.108  To date, only one 
municipality—the city of Takoma Park, Maryland has enacted 
legislation lowering the voting age to sixteen for local elections.109 
 The national age for draft eligibility and voluntary enlistment in 
any of the branches of the military absent parental consent is 
eighteen.110  Individuals who obtain parental consent may voluntarily 
enlist at seventeen.111 
 The age at which individuals become eligible to sit on federal 
juries is eighteen, lowered from twenty-one in 1972 by amendment to 
the federal Jury Selection and Service Act.112  In the states, there is 
                                                                                                             
ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 150, 159 (Richard A. Settersten Jr. et 
al. eds., 2005). 
 105. See Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, supra note 47, at 1448. 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States, who 
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of age.”). 
 107. See 17-Year-Old Primary Voting, FAIRVOTE, http://archive3.fairvote.org/reforms/ 
universal-voter-registration/17-year-old-primary-voting-2/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). 
 108. See Hamilton, Democratic Inclusion, supra note 47, at 1465-74 (listing nations 
that have already lowered the voting age and those with pending efforts to do so). 
 109 Lindsay A. Powers, Takoma Park Grants 16-Year-Olds Right to Vote, WASH. 
POST (May 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/takoma-park-grants-16-year-
olds-right-to-vote/2013/05/14/b27c52c4-bccd-11e2-89c9-3be8095fe767_story.html. 
 110. 10 U.S.C. § 505(a) (2012). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Act of Apr. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-269, 86 Stat. 117 (amending 28 U.S.C. 
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only slightly more variation in the age of jury eligibility, and these 
closely track the states’ respective ages of majority.113  Thus, the near 
universal age at which individuals become eligible for jury service is 
eighteen (in forty-six states and the District of Columbia);114 the age 
for jury service eligibility is nineteen in two states115 and twenty-one in 
two other states.116 
 Although individuals acquire most rights to civic and political 
participation upon reaching the age of majority, it is not unusual for 
governments to impose separate age requirements on holders of 
various state and federal offices.  Both federal and state constitutional 
provisions require individuals to meet higher age requirements in 
order to qualify to hold certain offices.117 
6. The Right to Medical and Procreative Choice 
 The authority to make medical decisions affecting minors 
presumptively rests with their parents.118  Only upon reaching the age 
of majority are individuals categorically entitled to make their own 
medical decisions.119  Minors may consent to treatment in some 
circumstances, including in cases of emergency, in cases involving 
reproductive health care (such as contraceptive services, prenatal care, 
and examination and treatment for sexual assault and sexually 
transmitted diseases), and in cases involving mental health care 
(which extends to outpatient substance abuse and mental health 
treatment).120 
                                                 
 113. Compare Termination of Support—Age of Majority, supra note 51 (providing 
age of majority of individual states), with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (giving 
jury qualification age for individual states).  
 114. Roper, 543 U.S. 551 app. (listing minimum age for jury service in forty-eight 
states and the District of Columbia); OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030(2)(c) (2009); 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 4502 (2016). 
 115. ALA. CODE § 12-16-60(a)(1) (2016); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1601(1) (2015). 
 116. MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-5-1 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 494.425(1) (2015). 
 117. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 118. B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: 
Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 38 (2012); Kimberly M. 
Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-Making 
Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 259 (2005). 
 119. David M. Vukadinovich, Minors’ Rights To Consent to Treatment: Navigating 
the Complexity of State Laws, 37 J. HEALTH L. 667, 667-68 (2004) (“While the law is clear 
with regard to the right of competent adults to consent to or refuse medical treatment, state 
statutes generally are more complicated when the patient is a minor.”). 
 120. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent 
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 States may require minors to obtain parental consent prior to 
obtaining an abortion.  But states must provide for an alternative 
bypass procedure where a neutral third-party must consent to the 
abortion upon finding either that (1) the minor is sufficiently mature 
and informed to make the decision independently or (2) an abortion 
would be in her best interests.121  Generally, emancipated minors and 
minors determined on an individualized basis to possess adequate 
maturity (pursuant to what is known as the “mature minor” doctrine) 
may also make their own medical decisions.122 
C. Exceptions to the Age of Majority 
 A survey of just a number of the legal exceptions to the 
presumptive age of majority, like the one that follows, leads to two 
conclusions about the age of majority itself.  First, the proliferation of 
exceptions to it demonstrates that the age of majority insufficiently 
meets current social needs.  That the exceptions alter legal 
consequences for individuals variously past the age of majority and 
those who have not yet attained it, moreover, suggests that perhaps no 
categorical age of majority can adequately meet social needs. 
 Second, the existence of exceptions that apply in specific legal 
contexts demonstrates that it is not unduly burdensome for lawmakers 
to engage in this sort of context-specific rulemaking.  Stated 
differently, categorical rules like the age of majority serve useful 
purposes by eliminating uncertainty and advancing efficiency.  Yet 
lawmaking that impacts young people has already begun to alter in 
order to better address, in comparison to the presumptive age of 
majority, the needs of society and capacities or incapacities of young 
people. 
                                                 
 121. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647-48 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-76 (1976).  For a cogent analysis of these cases that 
concludes that they fail to meaningfully expand children’s broader claims to constitutional 
rights, see Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 589 (2002). 
 122. Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical 
Treatment, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 504-08 (2001) (discussing and critiquing exceptions 
applied to emancipated and “mature” minors and arguing in favor of a bright-line rule 
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1. Contract Rights, Labor Market Participation, and the Right to 
Medical and Procreative Choice (Redux) 
 Young people do not formally acquire the rights to contract, fully 
participate in the labor market, or independently make medical and 
procreative choices until reaching the age of legal majority.  However, 
as previously discussed, exceptions to each of these rules allow 
minors to engage regularly in these activities prior to attaining 
majority.123  In each of these contexts, the exceptions better describe 
the reality of young people’s experiences—and the needs of society—
than does the presumptive rule. 
2. Giving Sexual Consent 
 Every state has established a minimum age at which individuals 
may consent to sex.  Seven states have set the age of sexual consent at 
eighteen—the legal age of majority in those states.  The remainder 
have set the age of consent below the age of majority.124  The most 
common age adopted by states is sixteen, while four states have set 
the age of sexual consent at age fourteen.125 
 Although sexual consent laws on occasion lead to the criminal 
prosecution of teenagers who engage in consensual sex, states have 
generally revised their laws so that only individuals who are 
significantly older than the minor below the age of consent are subject 
to prosecution.126  Historically, statutory rape laws aimed to protect 
women and restrict their sexual activity.127  Today, the age of sexual 
consent and statutory rape laws that rely on the age differential 
between the victim and perpetrator reflect pragmatic responses to the 
prevalence of teenage sexual activity.  Indeed, nearly half of all high 
school students surveyed in 2009 reported having engaged in sexual 
intercourse.128 
                                                 
 123. See discussion supra subpart I.B. 
 124. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and 
a Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 486 (2004). 
 125. Id.; see also Todres, supra note 13, at 1139-41 (discussing state laws on age of 
consent). 
 126. Asaph Glosser et al., Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting 
Requirements, DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, ES-1, 6 tbl.1, 6-8 (2004), http://aspe.hhs. 
gov/hsp/08/SR/StateLaws/report.pdf. 
 127. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 
TEX. L. REV. 387, 401-02 (1984). 
 128. Danice K. Eaton et al., Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance—United States, 2009, 
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3. The Right To Drive 
 Although car crashes kill more teens than any other cause, the 
United States grants drivers’ licenses earlier than any other nation in 
the developed world.129  Every state issues licenses to individuals 
younger than eighteen, with most states setting the age of licensure at 
sixteen.130  A few states set the driving age at fourteen or fifteen, and 
only one—New Jersey—has set it higher, at age seventeen.131 
 The youngest drivers crash at the highest rates.  Crash rates are 
consistently highest among sixteen-year-olds and decline substantially 
with each year of increasing age.132  Younger novice drivers have 
significantly higher crash rates than do older novices.133  This evidence 
has led most states to adopt graduated licensing systems which permit 
novice drivers to gain experience but impose on them restrictions (e.g., 
passenger limits and night-time driving restrictions) aimed at reducing 
their exposure to hazardous driving contexts.134 
4. The Right To Purchase, Possess, and Consume Alcohol 
 Congress conditioned states’ receipt of federal highway funds on 
their imposing a drinking age of twenty-one.135  In light of high rates 
of alcohol-related injuries and death, many states readily raised their 
drinking ages.136  Some lawmakers argued against what they viewed as 
inconsistent and unfair treatment of young people eighteen and older.  
They reasoned that young people who were subject to the draft and 
permitted to enlist voluntarily in the armed services ought not be 
denied the adult right to consume alcohol.137  While arguments against 
raising the drinking age above states’ ages of majority failed, some 
                                                 
 129. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Liberty Without Capacity: Why States Should Ban 
Adolescent Driving, 48 GA. L. REV. 1019 (2014) [hereinafter Hamilton, Liberty Without 
Capacity]. 
 130. Id. at 1021. 
 131. Id. at 1034. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1029-30. 
 134. Id. at 1031. 
 135. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding 
statute as a valid exercise of Congressional spending power). 
 136. Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum Drinking Age for Young People: An 
Observation, 92 DICK. L. REV. 649, 653-54 (1988). 
 137. See Cunningham, supra note 54, at 298 (discussing debate and defeat of bill 
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scholars have suggested that the psychological research on adolescent 
and emerging adult capacity supports lowering the drinking age.138 
5. Continued Entitlement to Parental Support and Benefits 
 The Dependent Coverage Mandate of the ACA expanded the 
availability of health insurance for young adults by allowing those 
aged nineteen to twenty-six to remain covered as dependents under 
their parents’ plans.139  Minors have long received medical coverage 
through their parents’ employer-provided health plans.140  After age 
eighteen or graduating from college, however, minors were 
reclassified as adults and lost their dependent status, along with the 
derivative health benefits that attended it.141  These young adults 
obtained health coverage only with difficulty, if at all.142  One in three 
young adults aged nineteen to twenty-five had no health insurance in 
2010.143  The effect of the Dependent Coverage Mandate was dramatic, 
and parents rushed to add their adult children to their health plans.144  
By the end of 2011, parents had extended health insurance to 6.6 
million young adults who had been ineligible for such coverage 
before the ACA’s passage.145 
                                                 
 138. See id. at 297. 
 139. Sara R. Collins et al., Young, Uninsured, and in Debt: Why Young Adults Lack 
Health Insurance and How the Affordable Care Act Is Helping, COMMONWEALTH FUND 2 
(June 2012), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/ 
2012/Jun/1604_collins_young_uninsured_in_debt_v4.pdf [hereinafter Collins et al., Why 
Young Adults Lack Health Insurance]. 
 140. Id. at 3.  Children who receive health coverage through Medicaid or the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program are reclassified as adults on their nineteenth birthdays 
and, with the exceptions of pregnant women or parents of children with very low incomes, 
also lose their health coverage.  Id. at 1. 
 141. Id. at 15 n.4. 
 142. Sara R. Collins et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential: How the Affordable 
Care Act Is Helping Young Adults Stay Covered, COMMONWEALTH FUND 1 (May 2011), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/issue-brief/2011/may/1508_ 
collins_how_aca_is_helping_young_adults_reform_brief_v5_corrected.pdf [hereinafter 
Collins et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential]. 
 143. Robin A. Cohen & Michael E. Martinez, Health Insurance Coverage: Early 
Release of Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, January–March 2011, CDC 
(Sept. 2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/insur201109.pdf (finding 33.9% 
of nineteen- to twenty-five-year-olds to be uninsured in 2010); Carmen DeNavas-Walt et al., 
Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2011, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Sept. 2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf (finding 29.8% of 
nineteen- to twenty-five-year-olds to be uninsured in 2010). 
 144. Collins et al., Realizing Health Reform’s Potential, supra note 142, at 1. 
 145. Cohen & Martinez, supra note 143; see also Yaa Akosa Antwi et al., Effects of 
Federal Policy To Insure Young Adults: Evidence from the 2010 Affordable Care Act 
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 The Dependent Coverage Mandate extends to a wide swath of 
legal adults a benefit long associated with minor and dependent status.  
Its very title signals that this cohort of legal adults commonly remains 
reliant on others in significant respects.  As such, they lack the 
independence that is one of the characteristic markers of adulthood, 
despite having formally attained that legal status. 
III. ADULTHOOD DEINSTITUTIONALIZED 
 This Part discusses the nature of the transition to adulthood, 
which is not at all fixed nor definite.146  It is instead variable, not only 
with respect to its timing (whether it occurs earlier or later in a young 
person’s life), but also with respect to its substance (those 
characteristics whose attainment mark adult status).  Put another way, 
changes over time alter the social context in which young people 
come of age, which in turn influences both the age at which they 
reach adult status and the manner by which they reach it. 
 Variations in social contexts have gone a long way toward 
shaping young people’s transitions to and conceptions of adulthood.  
In the United States and other western countries, the transition to 
adulthood is both exceptionally unstructured and prolonged.  This Part 
argues that the nature of the transition has contributed to a modern 
conception of adulthood itself as a status achieved only gradually and 
not dependent on the attainment of specific external events, such as 
marriage or the completion of education.147  Part IV will discuss the 
policy implications of the historical developments discussed in this 
Part. 
A. Structural Influences on the Transition to Adulthood 
 Historians of society have identified five significant events that 
have, for more than a century, marked the transition from minority to 
adulthood for most young Americans.  These have been: 
(1) marrying; (2) leaving their parents’ homes; (3) establishing 
                                                                                                             
June 2012) (reporting on the health insurance and labor market implications of the recent 
Affordable Care Act).  
 146. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: Understanding the New Way of 
Coming of Age, in EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 
4 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006) [hereinafter Arnett, 
Understanding the New Way of Coming of Age] (“The timing and meaning of . . . reaching 
full adult status [] is different today than it was 50 or 100 years ago . . . .”). 
 147. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Suffering, Selfish, Slackers?  Myths and Reality About 
Emerging Adults, 36 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 23, 25 (2007); see also infra subpart III.B 
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households of their own; (4) completing their educations or leaving 
school; and (5) entering the workforce.148  While a minority of the 
young population has always taken other paths to adulthood (e.g., 
never marrying or remaining resident with their parents), the 
dominance of this five-part pathway to adulthood has made it the 
modern “bedrock of social organization,” channeling most Americans 
onto “paths to a narrowly conceived adulthood.”149 
 Most young Americans thus experienced each of the five 
transition events along the course to adulthood.  The timing of the 
events and the order in which they have tended to occur, however, 
have varied in important ways over time.150   A whole range of 
interrelated social contexts have influenced these variations, with 
structural changes having particular salience for young people coming 
of age in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.  Scholars now 
characterize the transition to adulthood during this period of roughly 
one hundred years, not as a continuous evolution or trend, but as 
separable into three discrete but related eras. 
 The first era spans 1900 to 1950.  During this period, young 
people both discontinued their educations and entered the workforce 
at early ages—in their teen years.151  Although employed full-time, 
they nonetheless tended to remain in their parents’ households, 
delaying marriage.  Because the wages earned by young people were 
relatively low, full-time employment generally provided insufficient 
income to enable them immediately to set up independent 
households. 152   Instead, young people continued to rely on the 
financial and residential security of their parents’ households for a 
number of years following their entry into the paid workforce.153  
Parents, in turn, relied on their children’s labor and earnings, their own 
economic instability due largely to across-the-board job insecurity and 
the exclusion of married women from the workplace.154 
 The socio-economic context of this first period of the twentieth 
century contributed to an extended period of intergenerational 
interdependence.  Young people did not complete the five-part 
                                                 
 148. John Modell et al., Social Change and Transitions to Adulthood in Historical 
Perspective, 1 J. FAM. HIST. 7 (1976). 
 149. Jordan Stanger-Ross et al., Falling Far from the Tree: Transitions to Adulthood 
and the Social History of Twentieth-Century America, 29 SOC. SCI. HIST. 625, 626 (2005). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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 153. Id. at 638. 
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transition to adulthood—which would include moving from their 
parents’ households into their own and marrying—until relatively late 
in life.155 
 The nature of young people’s transition to adulthood changed 
during a distinct second era, extending from approximately 1950 into 
the 1970s.  Significant changes in the institutional and economic 
context that characterized this period prompted equally significant 
changes in the transition to adulthood.  Wartime and postwar 
industrialization and the introduction of government social programs 
together contributed to a period of unprecedented economic 
prosperity in the decades that followed.156 
 Government programs introduced during this era included Social 
Security and old-age pensions, which lessened older Americans’ 
reliance on their children’s wages.157  New Deal programs guaranteeing 
private investments facilitated individual and family saving.  Other 
programs underwrote and made loans to homeowners, making home 
ownership more readily available to younger buyers.158 
 The military needs brought on by the nation’s involvement in 
World War II provided abundant job opportunities for service 
members themselves and for those away from the battlefields whose 
labor was needed to support the war effort. 159   Manufacturing 
accelerated during the war, and postwar industrialization ushered in an 
era of unprecedented economic opportunity.160  Jobs in manufacturing 
generally required neither formal education nor high levels of skill, 
encouraging young people to enter the workforce at younger ages.  
Only one in three adults took the time to complete high school during 
this period, and one in sixteen completed college.161  Industries’ need 
for laborers in the postwar economy nonetheless led to continued job 
opportunities and increasing wages, particularly for young men.162 
 Three factors in particular contributed to young people’s leaving 
their parents’ homes and marrying at ages younger than at any time in 
                                                 
 155. Id. at 626. 
 156. Id. at 640. 
 157. Id. at 639. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Catherine A. Fitch & Steven Ruggles, Historical Trends in Marriage Formation: 
The United States 1850-1990, in THE TIES THAT BIND: PERSPECTIVES ON MARRIAGE AND 
COHABITATION 59, 65 (Linda J. Waite et al. eds., 2000). 
 161. Percent of People 25 Years and Over Who Have Completed High School or 
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the nation’s history: (1) their ability to earn high wages at young ages; 
(2) the implementation of government programs that supported 
homeownership; and (3) government-provided support for higher 
education, particularly for former service members.163 
 This midcentury era of early and rapid transition to adulthood 
and family life where men’s labor paid them a wage sufficient to 
support a family represented an historical aberration, not a new 
norm. 164   Nonetheless, just as the “single-earner, breadwinner-
homemaker marriage” of the 1950s became entrenched in the 
collective memory as the “traditional” family,165 it is possible that 
shifts in the timing of these transitions that occurred during this period 
became entrenched as the normative transition to adulthood.  If so, 
adoption of this conception, in which young people became capable 
of establishing households, marrying, and gaining financial 
independence by their late teens, may help explain the readiness with 
which Americans accepted the across-the-board lowering of the legal 
age of majority that occurred shortly after this historical period. 
 The third era, which continues today, began in the 1970s.  By the 
end of that decade, the decline of industry made low-skilled 
manufacturing jobs scarce.  Moreover, well-paying jobs in what was 
becoming a service- and technology-based postindustrial economy 
increasingly required higher levels of formal education.166  College 
enrollment increased in the immediate aftermath of the Great 
Recession, which led to more young adults remaining in (or returning 
to) their parents’ households.167  Employment and relative earning for 
young men declined, with wages in particular falling significantly 
from 2000 to 2010.168 
 Many of the jobs in the modern economy pay less than the 
manufacturing jobs of the twentieth century.169  The best of these jobs 
also require higher education.170  According to one report, two-thirds 
                                                 
 163. Id. at 640-41; Michael R. Haines, Long Term Marriage Patterns in the United 
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Paper No. 80, 1996).  
 164. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 627. 
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 166. Stanger-Ross et al., supra note 149, at 642-43. 
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of high-growth, high-wage jobs require employees to have a college 
degree.171 
 Individuals thus began spending more years gaining higher 
levels of education and participating in the workforce, both to finance 
their educations and to build financial resources for their future 
needs.172  While engaged in these activities, they delayed marriage and 
forming households of their own.  Instead, they tended to spend this 
protracted period of the transition to adulthood in relative autonomy, 
despite often spending part of the period living in the parents’ 
households.173  Young people today thus take longer to complete the 
five-part transition to adulthood than they did in the past, undertaking 
each traditional transition event at a later age than in previous 
decades.174 
 Viewing the “dramatic shifts” in the path to adulthood in the 
historical context in which they transpired helps “serve to undermine 
a normative understanding of the transition to adulthood and to point, 
instead, to its deeply historical dynamics.” 175   Young people’s 
conceptions of the transition to adulthood, examined in the following 
subpart, emphasize the variable aspects of the pathway to adulthood 
and the variable meaning of adulthood itself. 
B. Socio-Cultural Conceptions of Modern Adulthood 
 Psychologist Jeffrey Arnett conducted a series of studies across 
the United States to identify contemporary conceptions of adulthood 
among young people themselves.176  The studies found that their 
conceptions depart radically from the traditional conception of the 
transition to adulthood. 
 Young people rarely list any of the five transition events (i.e., 
marrying, leaving parents’ homes, establishing independent 
households, completing educations or leaving school, and entering the 
workforce) that have long defined the attainment of adult status.  
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Instead, researchers have consistently found that individuals perceive 
the most significant markers of adulthood to be: (1) accepting 
responsibility for oneself; (2) making independent decisions; and 
(3) attaining financial independence.177 
 For the young people who participated in the studies, accepting 
responsibility for oneself connotes shouldering the responsibilities 
previously assumed by parents rather than expecting parents to deal 
with the consequences of one’s actions.178   Independent decision 
making to them connotes making important life decisions oneself, 
outside the influence of one’s parents.179   And to be financially 
independent means no longer relying on one’s parents to pay one’s 
bills.180 
 Researchers in other industrialized countries have conducted 
similar studies, and results have been remarkably uniform across 
regions as well as across ethnic and socio-economic groups.181  These 
results hold even in regions with culturally or religiously significant 
coming-of-age milestones.182  In the Jewish tradition, for example, the 
bar mitzvah has long marked the adolescent boy’s transition to 
adulthood and his assumption of the religious obligations of adult 
Jewish males. 183   Similarly, in Latin cultures, the quinceañera 
celebration marks the adolescent girl’s transition to adulthood.184  Yet 
studies conducted in Israel and Argentina, where each ceremony is 
celebrated almost universally, revealed that while these ceremonial 
milestones might be significant cultural and religious events, they are 
not significant markers of adulthood.185  Instead, individuals in these 
cultures, as in other industrialized regions where researchers 
conducted similar studies, view the three responsibility- and 
independence-related criteria as the more meaningful markers of adult 
status.186 
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 These findings also point to what appears to be a fundamental 
historical shift in two respects.  First, in cultures across the globe, and 
for most of American history, marriage has been the singular event 
marking the attainment of full adult status.187  Marriage continues to 
be an important social institution in the United States, but individuals 
no longer rank marriage as necessary, or even important, in making 
the transition to adulthood.  It is losing—or has perhaps already lost—
its historical primacy as a marker of adult status.188 
 Second, as Arnett explains, individuals achieve each of the three 
markers gradually rather than experiencing them as the transition 
events previously discussed—in other words, as “milestones that take 
place at a specific time and that a person clearly either has or has not 
reached,” such as getting married or completing education.189  This 
absence of readily identifiable markers may contribute to what young 
people who have attained the age of legal majority consistently report 
with respect to their status: Despite having formally reached legal 
adult status, young people in the process of developing what they 
perceive to be the markers of adulthood report that they do not 
consider themselves adults.  Instead, they feel as though they occupy a 
status somewhere between adolescence and full adulthood.190 
 Arnett has termed this in-between period “emerging adulthood,” 
which he characterizes as a distinct developmental period spanning 
approximately ages eighteen to twenty-five.191  He emphasizes that it 
is a status largely experienced by young people in wealthier, 
developed nations rather than a universal stage of development.  
Nonetheless, his theory of emerging adulthood finds additional 
empirical support in the developmental sciences.  The following 
subpart turns to the developmental aspects of the transition to 
adulthood. 
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C. Cognitive and Socio-Emotional Development from Adolescence 
Through Emerging and Early Adulthood 
 The state’s use of a categorical age of majority represents a 
rough judgment about the development of maturity and competence.192  
This subpart briefly surveys aspects of individual development that 
may bear on our understanding of that development and the course of 
young people’s attainment of various capabilities.  It begins with the 
development of general cognitive capacity over the course of 
adolescence, defined by researchers as the developmental period 
(rather than a period defined strictly by chronological age) following 
childhood and spanning approximately ages twelve to seventeen.193 
 General cognitive capacity includes the abilities to understand 
and logically reason from facts, process information, and assess the 
nature of a given situation.194  These basic cognitive abilities improve 
more or less linearly throughout childhood and reach mature levels by 
midadolescence—approximately age sixteen. 195   Researchers have 
concluded that the reasoning and basic information-processing 
capacities of the typical sixteen-year-old are “essentially 
indistinguishable” from those of adults.196 
 However, not all cognitive processes mature by midadolescence.  
Some processes, including certain aspects of working memory, 
continue to specialize and develop into adulthood, maturing only in 
the early twenties.197  Working memory is involved in a number of 
complex mental abilities, including the ability to filter irrelevant 
information and suppress inappropriate actions.198 
 Studies have confirmed adolescents’ competence to make 
rational decisions, but the contexts in which adolescents make 
decisions can drastically affect the quality of their decision making.199  
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When adolescents make decisions in contexts involving stressors that 
require them to exercise psychosocial maturity and regulatory 
competence—for example, “[i]n the heat of passion, . . . on the spur 
of the moment, in unfamiliar situations, . . . and when behavioral 
inhibition is required”—their decision making suffers.200  Researchers 
have come to refer to this phenomenon as the “competence-
performance distinction.”201 
 Researchers have also found adolescents to be as 
“knowledgeable, logical, reality-based, and accurate in the ways in 
which they think about risky activity . . . as their elders.”202  When 
making decisions about risk, adolescents’ decision-making process 
does differ in significant respects from that of adults.  Compared to 
adults, for example, adolescents tend to weigh and value benefits 
more heavily than they do risks.203  This tendency alone, though, 
seems inadequate to explain what are typical characteristics of 
adolescent behavior—impulsivity, risk taking, and sensation 
seeking.204 
 Developmental neuroscientists, aided by technological 
developments over the last decade that allow them to observe the 
brain as it performs different tasks, now posit that the development of 
neural systems along different timelines can help explain adolescent 
risk taking and poor decision making despite adolescents’ apparent 
cognitive abilities, as well as other aspects of adolescent behavior.205 
 The first neural system, referred to as the socio-emotional 
system, involves social-information-processing and reward seeking 
and processing.206  Activity in neural reward systems peaks rapidly 
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Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and 
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supra note 195. 
 200. Reyna & Farley, supra note 199, at 12. 
 201. Jennifer L. Woolard et al., Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Studying 
Children’s Capacities in Legal Contexts, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 219, 220 (1996). 
 202. Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195. 
 203. See Fischhoff, supra note 22, at 19-20; Geier & Luna, supra note 193, at 213. 
 204. Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 
216, 218 (2009); Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, supra note 195, at 79. 
 205. Stephanie Burnett et al., The Social Brain in Adolescence: Evidence from 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging and Behavioural Studies, 35 NEUROSCIENCE & 
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ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 111, 111-15 (2008). 
 206. Geier & Luna, supra note 193, at 216-17; see Steinberg, Adolescent Risk-Taking, 
supra note 195, at 83.  The socio-emotional system includes “the amygdala, nucleus 





2016] ADULTHOOD IN LAW AND CULTURE 89 
 
around the time of pubertal maturation (in early adolescence) and then 
declines.207  It is this peak in activity, neuroscientists believe, that leads 
to heightened reward salience—that is, adolescents experience 
rewarding stimuli as even more rewarding than during either 
childhood or adulthood.  This helps explain adolescent sensation-
seeking behaviors in which they seek out new and highly stimulating 
experiences and willingly taking risks in order to attain them.208 
 The system referred to as the cognitive control system, involving 
abilities to intentionally coordinate and engage in goal-directed 
behavior, follows a different developmental trajectory.  Its 
development is more gradual and linear than that of the socio-
emotional system.209  Along with other structural changes in the brain, 
this developmental trajectory correlates with the steady improvement 
of basic cognitive processes into adolescence, with the maturation of 
basic cognitive processes largely complete by midadolescence.210 
 In sum, adolescents’ basic cognitive abilities mature by age 
sixteen and give them the capacity to learn, process information, 
reason, and make rational decisions.  Self-regulatory capacities 
continue to develop, however, making adolescents susceptible to the 
confounding influence of their heightened sensitivity to reward.211  
This heightened sensitivity, which peaks around midadolescence, 
inclines adolescents towards sensation seeking, risk taking, and 
impulsivity.212  Self-regulatory immaturity can dominate or overwhelm 
                                                 
 207. Geier & Luna, supra note 193, at 216-17.  For a technical discussion of this 
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cognitive processes and drive adolescent behaviors, particularly in 
high-pressure contexts and those triggering heightened emotion.213 
 Brain development continues well into the mid-twenties.  
Advanced cognitive capacities, including higher-order and executive 
functions such as strategic planning, continue to improve linearly 
through late adolescence and early adulthood.214  These improvements 
correlate with structural changes that increase connections within and 
between different regions of the brain.215 
 Improved coordination of affect (the external expression of 
emotions) and cognition correlates with increased connectivity 
between regions of the brain involved in social and emotional 
information processing and those involved in cognitive processes.216  
Thus emotional regulation and impulse control both improve through 
adolescence and into the mid-twenties.  The continuation of 
developmental processes into the postadolescent period provides 
some neurobiological support that buttresses the behavioral case for 
categorizing “emerging adulthood” as a distinct period of 
development.217 
IV. DISMANTLING THE CATEGORICAL AGE OF MAJORITY 
 Part II demonstrated that the categorical age of majority fails to 
comport with the legal reality created by a host of rules whose 
adoption has imposed a growing number of exceptions to its 
presumptive operation.  Part III demonstrated that young people’s 
transition to adulthood, subjective construction of the transition to 
adulthood, and individual developmental processes all contemplate a 
gradual and prolonged process comprising the acquisition of general 
capabilities—not the achievement of externally constructed events.  
These capabilities, moreover, vary across contexts.  Thus young 
people tend to attain the capacity for financial independence relatively 
late in life but attain the capacity for making informed and rational 
decisions about their own medical care relatively early in life. 
 Informed by the preceding Parts, this Part contends that the 
exceptions to the presumptive age of majority better address the needs 
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of society and young people alike.  It argues for the explicit adoption 
of a “rule comprising exceptions”—in other words, for the 
abandonment altogether of the presumptive age of legal majority in 
favor of context-specific rules.  The state’s commitment to individual 
liberty supports such an approach because it extends to individuals 
those rights which they have attained the capacity to exercise. 
 This Part also argues that other commitments, namely 
commitments to community, mitigate against the retention of 
adulthood as a categorical legal status.  Finally, it provides guidance to 
lawmakers seeking to assess capacity in certain contexts, offering 
insights from behavioral decision research, and proposes the adoption 
of a number of policy measures consistent with the policymaking 
approach advanced here.  The subparts that follow elaborate these 
arguments. 
A. Context-Specific Competence 
 Young people reliably attain different capabilities at distinct 
stages of development.218  Accordingly, across a range of policymaking 
contexts, a categorical rule will fail to take account either of context-
specific capacities or of ongoing deficiencies.  This subpart first 
argues that the core commitments of the liberal democratic state 
require it to account for context-specific capabilities.219 It next argues 
that the state’s commitment to community (in tension with individual 
liberty but important nonetheless) provides further support for 
jettisoning adulthood as status. 
1. Individual Competence and Core Commitments of the Liberal 
Democratic State 
 Individual liberty is the core value of the liberal constitutional 
democratic state, and safeguarding its citizens’ liberty is therefore the 
state’s primary end.220  The minimum entitlement of all citizens is the 
basic liberty to decide one’s life course for oneself, and it is the state’s 
                                                 
 218. See discussion supra subpart III.C. 
 219. Behavioral scientists have posited one definition of context as “a culturally 
defined situation that (a) occurs in a particular time and place and (b) contains actors who 
perform culturally defined roles.”  James P. Byrnes, The Development of Self-Regulated 
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AND ADOLESCENTS 5, 7 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski eds., 2005). 
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duty to guarantee it.221  Those individuals whose capabilities in some 
respect remain immature have two basic categories of interests that 
the state should take account of in its decision making: welfare 
interests and autonomy interests.222  Their welfare interests pertain to 
their well-being, irrespective of any affirmative choice they make, 
including an interest in being protected from their own deficiencies.  
Their autonomy-related interests pertain to their exercising those 
specific liberties of which they are capable.223 
 Simply put, lawmakers should work to become more cognizant 
of and responsive to young people’s capacities and extend to them 
age- and context-specific liberties to make the self-regarding 
decisions of which they are capable.224  This decision-making process 
can indeed be a complex one, although the developmental and 
behavioral sciences can (and ought to) supplement the more 
traditional policymaking considerations.  The following subpart 
briefly discusses the assessment of context-specific capacity—a task 
which necessarily retains some level of imprecision. 
 Respected scholars, including Professor Elizabeth Scott, have 
argued against abandoning the age of majority as a categorical rule.225  
Scott reasons that, although like all categorical rules it includes some 
level of imprecision, the age of majority serves society’s purposes 
relatively well by advancing the goals of certainty and administrative 
efficiency.226  Moreover, to the extent it underestimates young persons’ 
capacities in certain legal contexts (such as the minors’ competence to 
execute contracts) and delays their ability to exercise certain rights, 
the harms are generally slight, and temporary.227 
 Although I agree with Scott’s identification of the costs and 
benefits of the categorical rule, I would weigh them differently.  
Existing law, rife with exceptions to the age of majority, demonstrates 
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that context-specific decision-making poses no undue burden on 
lawmakers.  The argument that failure to extend liberties despite 
individual capacity imposes minimal harm elides the primacy of the 
state’s obligation to individual liberty.  Where capacity exists, the 
justification for denying that liberty (or vesting it in a parent or 
guardian) disappears.  Further, with respect to certain rights, delay 
itself can constitute denial.  For example, the sixteen-year-old who 
would refuse surgery to correct a nonfatal congenital defect will be 
denied the right to do so if her parents consent to the procedure.  For 
the young patient, acquiring the right to make her own medical 
decisions after reaching majority provides no relief from the earlier 
denial of that right. 
2. Adult Status, Autonomy, and Relationship 
 As discussed above, young people in today’s developed nations 
identify as markers of adulthood: (1) accepting responsibility for 
oneself; (2) making independent decisions; and (3) attaining financial 
independence.228  At one level, this construction of adulthood is 
altogether unobjectionable.  Most parents, after all, work to raise their 
children to be responsible, financially independent adults. 
 At another level, this conception of adulthood is deeply troubling.  
Conspicuously absent from it are notions of obligation to community 
or family, or indeed any recognition of the role of ongoing connection 
and interdependence.229  The current conception of adulthood instead 
emphasizes as normative the attainment of individual autonomy and 
independence.  The absence of notions of community is particularly 
notable in light of the growing importance of ongoing familial 
support to young people coming of age today. 
 As discussed above, contemporary young people travel a 
prolonged path to independence, particularly financial independence. 
Many young people continue to be at least partially dependent on and 
tied to their natal families well past the legal age of adulthood.230  In 
2014 more adults aged eighteen to thirty-four lived with parents than 
                                                 
 228. See discussion supra subpart III.B. 
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with a spouse or partner in their own household, and the trend 
continues to increase.231 
 To the extent it expresses a societal expectation or norm of 
across-the-board independence (decisional, financial, etc.), the current 
conception of adulthood is out of step with the experiences of today’s 
young people.  To the extent that the law conveys a normative 
expectation that they are adults and thus ought to possess adult 
characteristics, their inability to have done so by the legally prescribed 
age may be both experienced and perceived as failure. 
 Not attaining the characteristics of adulthood by the legal age of 
majority, however, merely reflects the particular social context—
including the economic context—in which they are coming of age. 
 The state’s affirmative duty to take action for the purpose of 
expressing the importance of connection and interdependence is 
arguably quite limited.  But doing so presents lawmakers with what 
seems a rare opportunity to advance individual liberty (by rejecting 
the categorical rule in favor of rules more tailored to individual 
capacities) while also expressing the importance of relationships and 
community. 
B. Assessing Capacity: Lessons from Existing Law and Science 
 Categorical rules like an age of legal majority advance goals of 
administrative efficiency and certainty. 232   The existence of a 
categorical rule spares the decision maker in a given case the task of 
making burdensome (and likely unreliable) individualized 
assessments of capacity.  Yet as argued above, lawmakers in the liberal 
state have a duty to assess the capacities of immature citizens in legal 
contexts.233 
 In any given context, the interplay of various factors will 
influence capacity.  It is possible to characterize age-related capacity 
as a function of: (1) patterns of cognitive and socio-emotional 
development; (2) the nature of the capacity being exercised (e.g., 
characteristics of the task to be performed or the decision to be made); 
(3) the context in which the capacity will be exercised; and (4) the 
broader social, cultural, and economic milieu. 
 The interrelationship of factors in these categories shapes in 
predictable ways the typical individual’s capacity, for example, to 
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make a decision in a certain context or perform a given task.  
Identifying and accounting for the relevant aspects of these influences 
on the exercise of capacity can significantly improve policymakers’ 
predictive power. 
 What, if anything, can brain science contribute to lawmaking or 
policymaking?  It is now well known that the developmental sciences 
have shed light on aspects of child and adolescent behavior that has 
important policymaking implications.234  The most widely touted of 
these has been lawmaking in the area of juvenile justice.235  Casual 
observation can—and has—led to erroneous generalizations about 
behavior.  These mistaken generalizations in turn have led to 
misguided policymaking.  For example, adolescent impulsivity and 
susceptibility to peer pressure in certain situations have led to the 
conclusion that they lack the capacity to make reliably mature voting 
decisions in elections or medical decisions in a doctor’s office.236  
Conversely, adolescents’ ability to learn the mechanics of motor 
vehicle operation has led to the conclusion that they have the capacity 
to operate them competently.237  Both conclusions are wrong, and 
insights from the psychological and neurological sciences help 
explain why. 
C. Reconciling Law, Culture, and Capacity: An Example 
  One of the central tensions between social and legal adulthood 
is that individuals are likely to attain fundamental decision-making 
capacities before they can realistically attain financial stability and 
self-sufficiency.238  Yet a near universal consequence of reaching the 
age of majority is distentitlement to parental support.  Indeed, for 
many young people approaching the age of majority, perhaps one of 
the most significant changes attending their new status (especially, 
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perhaps, for individuals who have a parent who may be grudgingly 
subject to an order of support) is the expiration of parents’ obligation 
to provide them with support. 
 As discussed above, it was against a background of economic 
prosperity that states, upon lowering the ages of conscription and 
voting, also lowered the age of majority generally.  Young people who 
had previously been minors until age twenty-one (during a period 
when they arguably had less need of its protections until that age) 
became adults at eighteen.  With that status, they gained the legal 
rights of adulthood.  At the same time, they lost the right of parental 
support and even the special protections afforded minors by the state 
through its role as parens patriae. 
 In the intervening decades since lowering the age of majority, 
however, well-paying manufacturing jobs have all but disappeared.  
The incomes of workers with a high school degree or less have 
declined steeply, and their unemployment rates are particularly high.  
The largest share of jobs in the current economy has moved from 
manufacturing to the information and services sector, and as 
discussed above, the best of these jobs require postsecondary 
education.  Failing to recognize the importance of supporting young 
people as they strive to become the sorts of workers required in 
today’s economy disserves them in the short term, and the larger 
society in the longer term.  State lawmakers should thus seriously 
consider raising, perhaps to twenty-one, the age through which 
parents are obligated to support their children. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Young people’s conception of adulthood, and their experience of 
becoming adults, bears little resemblance to the legal construction of 
adulthood as status.  Although they formally attain adult status upon 
reaching the legal age of majority, that formal marker has remarkably 
little meaning in young people’s lives.  What is now socially 
meaningful is the gradual attainment of the various indicia of 
adulthood—responsibility for oneself, autonomous decision making, 
and financial self-sufficiency. 
 I have argued in this Article that the categorical age of majority 
contravenes a legal reality constructed by the proliferation of 
exceptions to it, young people’s social experience and subjective 
constructive of the transition to adulthood, and the capacities gained 
(and deficiencies retained) over the predictable course of individual 
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obligation to safeguard the basic liberties of its citizens.  Legal 
consequences linked to the age of majority are best amended to attach 
to the specific age to which they pertain—whether or not that is the 
current age of majority. 
 I suggest further that the time may have come to jettison not only 
adulthood as legal status but also adulthood as social construct.  
Doing so presents the state with a rare opportunity to simultaneously 
safeguard individual autonomy rights through context-specific 
rulemaking and also advance the importance of community 
relationships and the interdependencies of citizens, even in liberal 
society. 
